Rabu, 19 Maret 2014

## Get Free Ebook Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions), by Charles M. Cameron

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Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions), by Charles M. Cameron

Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions), by Charles M. Cameron



Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions), by Charles M. Cameron

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Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions), by Charles M. Cameron

With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining is a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.

  • Sales Rank: #1088297 in Books
  • Brand: Brand: Cambridge University Press
  • Published on: 2000-06-19
  • Original language: English
  • Number of items: 1
  • Dimensions: 8.98" h x .71" w x 5.98" l, .93 pounds
  • Binding: Paperback
  • 312 pages
Features
  • Used Book in Good Condition

Review
"This pathbreaking study should be in the library of every serious student of US national politics." Choice

Most helpful customer reviews

10 of 13 people found the following review helpful.
No Kidding!
By A Customer
The book review does not lie when it calls this book a major contribution. To political scientists interested in formal theory, the presidency, executive-legislative relations, or divided government, this book is one of the best to come along in years. Especially in presidential studies, this book is probably the best to come along since Light's "President's Agenda," and perhaps the best since 1960 and Neustadt's "Presidential Power." For formal theory people, this book is an exemplar of how good, rigorous theory and careful, skilled empirical analysis can work together to produce both a well-reasoned and well-supported picture of the veto and its affect on policy. For those who abhor formal theory, the rich case studies are informative reading, too. Overall, this book is what political science should be about.

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful.
Good empirical thought, horrible defense of rational choice theory
By FranMan1187
Let me start with the good. Cameron's evaluation of veto bargaining is well supported by the facts he presents, and the multiple models he elucidates work well to "cover" how and when Presidents will use (or at least threaten) a veto. Especially in the area of divided government, his analysis is rich, intelligent, and could present a decent step forward in how we understand presidential use of veto powers.

Unfortunately, a large chunk of the book is focused upon a truly awful defense of rational choice theory. Let me be honest: I believe that rational choice theory is a flawed but useful way to observe political actors and their decisions. It is prone to the fact that many people act against their own interests all the time, and arguments that attempt to create a single motivation for all political actors in a certain position are often too vulnerable to attack to be accepted as true. However, when used in "broad strokes" for specific actors or specific institutions, and when it avoids making these flawed arguments about single motivations, it typically works reasonably well.

Chapter 3 presents one of the most inane defenses of the subject that I have ever read. Rational choice theory is hardly as controversial as the author seems to think it is, and I found the vitriolic language he used defending it to be borderline insane. It is hardly a broad leap to claim that many individuals act against their own goods, and I did not appreciate being compared to the cardinal who refused to look through Galileo's telescope for considering it a flaw in rational choice theory. It is unacceptable to term rational choice theory "common sense", spend thirteen pages on why you refuse to address logical counterarguments, and then throw heavy-handed insults at those who wonder about typical counterarguments. I have never before read a book otherwise rooted in logic and empirical results that managed to be offensive at the same time. There are many better arguments for rational choice theory to be found, and it serves as an almost paradoxical weak point to an otherwise intelligent and well argued book.

Attempting to give a rating to a book like this is very difficult. On the one hand, the subject the book purports to be about is well defined and well-managed. On the other, the author's unbelievable arrogance and obtuseness in his arguments for rational choice theory are too maddening to really be ignored. I'm going to give it three starts, averaging for the better moments. What's truly incredible is that this would easily be a four-star book if the author had simply removed chapter three. It does nothing to help his arguments, and simply serves to instill disgust on the part of the reader.

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